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I. INTRODUCTION

Within living memory, most hospitals' were immune from tort liability
on the basis of charitable immunity. As this is written, however, hospitals find
themselves exposed to the expanding possibility of liability not only for their
"own" torts-torts committed by their own servants, breaching duties owed
directly by the hospital-but for the torts of others, including the malpractice
of independent contractor physicians committed on hospital premises. With
respect to such malpractice, hospitals seek to rely on the general rule that
principals' are not liable for the physical torts of independent contractors. 3

In the hospital context, however, this traditional rule is crumbling before

1. "Hospital" is typically defined by statute in such terms as the following:
[A hospital is] a facility organized and administered to provide overnight medical or
surgical care or nursing care of illness, injury, or infirmity and may provide
obstetrical care, and in which all diagnoses, treatment, or care is administered by or
under the direction of persons currently licensed to practice medicine, surgery, or
osteopathy.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-130(12) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Although this article speaks for the most part in terms of hospitals in the statutory sense,
its principles likely apply to other varieties of health-care providers. See Chase v. Independent
Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("Surprisingly little case law exists
on the liability of HMOs [or health maintenance organizations] for the negligence of their
participating physicians. That which does exist tends to suggest that the same principles of
liability that have been applied to hospitals will apply to HMOs.") (citations omitted); Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding that policy
considerations of the hospital's changing role in society are "certainly applicable" to HMOs); see
also Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (analogizing an HMO case
to a hospital context); Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that a
physician-owner of a medical clinic may be liable for the malpractice of a treating physician);
.William A. Chittenden, III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and
Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 454 (1991).
2. According to the Restatement,
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consentby the other so to act. (2) The one for whom action is to be taken
is the principal. (3) The one who is to act is the agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
3. See Hale v. Sheikholeslam, 724 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1984); Jeter v. DavisFischer Sanitarium Co., 113 S.E. 29, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1922); Badeaux v. East Jefferson Gen.
Hosp., 364 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Wilson v. Martin Memorial Hosp., 61
S.E.2d 102, 104 (N.C. 1950); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Ohio 1990);
Berarducciv. Rhode Island Hosp., 459 A.2d 963,964 (R.I. 1983); Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C.
236, 242, 329 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1985) (nonhospital case); Conlin v. City Council of Charleston,
15 Rich. 201 (1868) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1957);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND

KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 509 (5th ed. 1984); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent

Contractors§ 29 (1995).
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enthusiastic applications of the doctrine of "apparent" or "ostensible" agency,
direct actions based on duties (including nondelegable duties) owed directly to
patients by hospitals, and even elastic interpretations of respondeat superior.
The large number of such cases and the wide variety of theories being
successfully employed against a hospital's traditional defenses make inescapable the conclusion that the courts are responding to an expanding public
expectation of the responsibility that hospitals should bear for the success of
medical treatment within their walls.
By its decisions in Shuler v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center4 and
Strickland v. Madden,5 the South Carolina Court of Appeals has added South
Carolina to those states that have expanded hospital exposure. Shuler and
Strickland announce acceptance of an apparent agency theory of hospital
liability, finding apparent agency where (1) a hospital as principal consciously
or impliedly represents another to be its agent, (2) there is reliance upon the
representation, and (3) there is a change in position to the relying party's
detriment. 6 Further, in Strickland the Court of Appeals suggests that, if
presented with a proper case, it might apply the doctrine of "corporate
negligence," 7 based on a hospital's duty owed to patients of care in selecting
and in monitoring the competence of physicians using hospital facilities. 8
Compared to some opinions discussed in this article, Shuler and Strickland
are tentative in their recognition of hospital liability for independent contractor
malpractice, reflecting a relatively traditional balancing of interests, and, as
is discussed in Part V, a more traditional application of doctrine. The
fundamental issues involved are ones of public policy, and neither Shuler nor
Strickland purports to make a comprehensive review of applicable South
Carolina public policy. By contrast, shifting public policy strongly influences
opinions on the leading edge of hospital liability. This public policy shift in

4. 313 S.C. 225, 437 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993).
5. __ S.C. _,
448 S.E.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1994). For commentary on this case, see Robin
Sloan Cromer, Case Comment, Court ConsidersLimitationson Recoveryfor EmotionalDistress,
Adoption ofDoctrine of CorporateNegligence, 47 S.C. L. REv. 160 (1995).
6. Strickland,_ S.C. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 585; Shuler, 313 S.C. at 227, 437 S.E.2d at
129. On the apparent agency issue, Shuler and Stricklandboth affirmed summary judgment for
the hospital based on lack of reliance by the plaintiff. The requirements of reliance and causation
are discussed infra text accompanying note 92. For a criticism of Shuler's application of
traditional apparent agency analysis in the hospital context, see Houghland v. Grant, 891 P.2d
563, 569 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
7. That is, it might find liability based on negligent hiring or negligent supervision. See
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); Rodrigues v.
Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456, 462 (R.I. 1993); see also infra notes 179-208 and accompanying

text.
8. Strickland,
(Wash. 1984)).

S.C. at

_,
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certain other states makes apparent that, although it was once thought that the
public was benefitted indirectly by protecting care-giving hospitals from
liability, the perception of hospitals and medical care is changing. The
emerging view is that the care-giving aspect of hospitals entails significant
duties owed by hospitals to those within their care and that the public is
benefitted by enforcing these duties and, where injury occurs, by giving the
public access to the resources of hospitals (and their insurers). Put another
way, in such states hospitals are still performing a charity-like distributive
function, not as sanctuaries where medical care is made available but virtually
as insurers of the well-being of their patients. 9 The critical public policy
questions to be decided in each state concern the duties owed by a hospital to
its patients, and to what extent those duties should be fault-based. The latter
question will be answered by the theory selected to enforce hospital duties to
patients.
This article reviews the national movement toward increased hospital
liability for independent-contractor malpractice, reviews in a general way the
major theories on which such liability is based, and draws several conclusions.
First, the movement reflects changing public perceptions, and concomitantly
changing judicial views of public policy, based largely on changes originating
within the health care system itself. Second, despite the variety of avenues
employed by courts in reaching hospital liability for the malpractice of
independent contractors, the element that unites the cases is this changed
public perception, viewing the hospital, not the individual physician, as the
person responsible for delivering reasonable health care. Finally, sufficient
tools exist to serve public policy in this developing area of the law without
torturing the law of agency.
II. THE EXPOSURE OF HOSPITALS TO TORT LIABILITY:
THE DEMISE OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

Throughout the country, charity hospitals and other charitable organizations were traditionally protected from liability by the doctrine of charitable
immunity,' 0 which rested on various fictional premises." Underlying these
fictions was a public policy favoring charity and charitable hospitals, reflecting
the view that by benefitting such public-purpose institutions, the public as a

9. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1046 ("This expansion of a hospital's duties... has progressed
in varying degrees... towards imposing strict liability upon hospitals.").
10. See Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
11. One such fictional premise is the "trust fund theory" that donated funds are held in trust
in order to carry out the intent of the donor and, therefore, that charitable organizations should
not be required to divert donated funds to defending suits and paying judgments. Id.; see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 133, at 1069-70.
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whole was benefitted. 12 Charity hospitals were accordingly granted the public
subsidy of immunity.
In 1957 the death knell of charitable immunity for hospitals was sounded

by the New York Court of Appeals in Bing v. Thunig.13 The reasoning of
Bing was based squarely on the perceived evolution of hospitals into business

enterprises upon which patients relied directly for treatment. 14 The Bing
opinion concluded that the rule of immunity for hospitals was antiquated and
"should be discarded." 5
In 1977 the South Carolina Supreme Court took a step in the direction of
Bing in Brown v. Anderson County HospitalAss'n,"6 modifying the doctrine
of charitable immunity as applied to charitable hospitals, 7 and in 1981
completed the job in Fitzer v. Greater Greenville South Carolina YMCA, 8
abolishing altogether what the court referred to as "this archaic doctrine. " 19

12. See generally Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 78 A. 898 (Me. 1910); Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Vermillion v. Women's College of
Due W., 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
13. 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
14. Id. at 8. According to recent statistics gathered by the American Hospital Association,
approximately 13.8 % of hospitals are for-profit. In addition, for-profit hospitals account for 9.2 %
of total patient days spent in the hospital, 9.8 % of admissions, and 11.5 % of available hospital
bed space. William J.Link, NonprofitHospitalMergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38
J.L. & ECON. 437, 438 (1995). Estimates indicate also that if those nonprofit and public hospitals
actually managed by for-profit organizations are included in the statistics, for-profit controlled
hospitals total almost 20%. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive
Damages in Medical Malpractice:TargetingAmoral Corporations,Not "MoralMonsters", 47
RUTGER L. REV. 975, 1083 n.263 (1995) (citing BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MoTrivE
AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITY OF DocTORs AND HosPrrALs 16-17
(1991)).
15. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 9. Although the court was undoubtedly giving proper recognitionto

changes in medical practice and societal attitudes, it is quite likely that the court was also
motivated by the increasing desire to find a "deeper pocket" from which to compensate those
injured by medical malpractice. See G. Keith Phoenix & Anne L. Schlueter, HospitalLiability
for the Acts ofIndependent Contractors:The OstensibleAgency Doctrine, 30 ST. LOUis U. L.J.
875, 877 n.18 (1986).
16. 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977).
17. In Brown the court held that a charitable hospital was liable if an injury occurred because
of the heedless and reckless disregard of a plaintiff's rights. Id. Although the plaintiff was
required to prove more than simple negligence, Brown's relaxed standard began to expose
charitable hospitals to liability. See also Hupman v. Erskine College, 281 S.C. 43, 46, 314

S.E.2d 314, 316 (1984) (Harwell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[d]uring the past decade, the
doctrine of charitable immunity has been gradually eroded in South Carolina") (citing S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (regarding waiver of hospital immunity for employee's
tortious acts)); Jeffcoat v. Caine, 261 S.C. 75, 198 S.E.2d 258 (1973) (stating that there is no
charitable immunity for intentional torts).
18. 277 S.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 230 (1981).
19. Id. at 4, 282 S.E.2d at 231. The General Assembly responded to Fitzerby enacting, over
the following several years, what can now be viewed as the statutory remnants of charitable
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In recent years a great deal has been written about the change in public
perception of hospitals to a view that, no matter how they are organized or
what they call themselves, they are not donative charities but profit-making
businesses, ever more so in today's climate of amalgamation in the health care
system.'m Perceived as large and growing businesses, hospitals have become
attractive litigation targets, probably more attractive than individual physicians
and evidently carrying higher-limit insurance policies than those of physicians.21 Reference to the decided cases, however, indicates that the most
important driver in the shift in public perception has been hospitals' marketing
of themselves-using the tools of mainstream commerce-as full-service
healthcare providers.'

Hospitals must resort to such activity in order to maintain pace with
rapidly changing technologies, to remain in a position to provide the highest
levels of care, and to support their undeniable public service role. These
results, doubtless, are demanded by the public. Nevertheless the twin effects
of the commercialization of hospitals have been a loss of public sympathy and
an enhanced view of the hospital's duty to patients. Public expectations, raised
by the hospitals' own marketing, are being taken strongly into account by
courts in many states in assessing duties owed by hospitals to patients.
Although this sea change in public perception cuts across a comprehensive
range of issues relating to hospital liability to patients, among its most
controversial effects are those relating to hospital liability for the torts of
nonemployee, or independent contractor, physicians. "Independent contractor"
is the rubric applied by the Restatement of Agency both to true independent

immunity. The protection afforded by these remnants is spotty. Nevertheless, the South Carolina
Code subjects tort recovery against "charitable organizations" to a cap on damages. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-56-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Moreover, other provisions in the code protect,
under certain circumstances, members of governing boards of certain nonprofit organizations
from suit. See S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 33-31-834, -202(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C.
Weiler, EnterpriseMedicalLiability and the Evolution of theAmerican Health CareSystem, 108
HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994); H. Ward Classen, HospitalLiabilityfor Independent Contractors:
Where Do We Go from Here?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 469 (1987); Arthur F. Southwick, Hospital
Liability:Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1983).
21. E.g., Diane M. Janulis & Alan D. Hornstein, DamnedIf You Do, Damned If You Don't:
Hospitals' Liability for Physicians'Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REv. 689, 691 (1985); see also
supra note 15.
22. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987) (stating that the
enhanced duty of hospitals "is... consonant with the public perception of the hospital as a
multifaceted health care facility responsible for the quality of medical care and treatment
rendered, [and] ... is consistent with the commercialization of American medicine"); Sharsmith
v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 672 (Wyo. 1988) ("[Iospitals are 'corporate entities capable of acting
only through human beings whose services the hospital engages' and [from whom] hospitals
derive financial profit by holding 'themselves out to the public as offering and rendering quality
health care services.'") (quoting Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985)).
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contractors and to agents who are not servants.' The physical torts of
independent contractors are not imputed to principals, under the wellestablished general rule?' By contrast, when an agent can be shown to be a
servant-an agent subject to the principal's right of physical control of the
details of the agency-the principal is liable for the agent's physical torts
committed within the scope of the agent's employment, under the familiar
6
doctrine of respondeatsuperior.'
In the case of torts committed by independent contractor physicians, then,
the general rule apparently would insulate the hospital from liability. As will
be seen in Section m, the independent contractor rule is all but defunct with
respect to physicians who are employed directly by hospitals and are therefore
the hospitals' agents. The rule continues to have some viability, however, with
respect to "true," or non-agent, independent contractors. Hospitals strive to
take advantage of this remaining viability by engaging many high-risk
specialties such as radiology, pathology, anesthesiology, clinical laboratories
and, in particular, emergency room services27 from true independent
contractor physicians.2 The relevant hospital-physician contracts commonly
describe the physician's relationship to the hospital as that of independent
contractor.2 9 By the terms of these contracts, the independent contractor
physician does not receive a salary from the hospital, and the hospital has no
right of control over the physician in providing professional services.3" The
23.

An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the
performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1957); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 409-429 (1965). However, by definition, an independent contractor is never a servant.
This is due to a number of factors, the one most emphasized being the principal's right of control
over the agent's physical performance of his duties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220 (1957); see also infra note 43, discussing the test for servant status.
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25. "A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to
control by the master." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957).
The word "servant" is thus used to distinguish a group of persons for whose
physical conduct the master is responsible to third persons.... IThe term
"independent contractor" is used to indicate all persons for whose conduct, aside from
their use of words, the employer is not responsible except in the performance of nondelegable duties.
Id. § 2 cmt. b.
26. "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment." Id. § 219; see also id. §§ 220-249.
27. Classen, supra note 20, at 471 n.7.
28. Southwick, supranote 20, at 9-10.
29. Id. at9.
30. Id. These characterizations in employment contracts are often ineffective. See infranotes
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focus of this article is on such "true," nonagent, independent contractor
physicians.
The broadening view of hospital responsibility to patients, however,
manifests itself in a number of doctrines skirting the independent contractor
rule. The South Carolina Court of Appeals' decisions in Strickland and Shuler
touch upon two such doctrines: direct liability and apparent agency. These and
other vicarious and direct theories of hospital liability for independent
contractor malpractice are reviewed in the sections that follow.

I.VICARIOUS LIABILITY
No longer shielded by charitable immunity, hospitals are liable for the
torts of servants agents under various theories of vicarious liability. The most
31 against
familiar and best developed such theory is respondeat superior,
which hospitals employ the defense of the independent contractor rule.
A. Actual Agency: Respondeat Superior
Since the demise of charitable immunity, all hospitals, like other
businesses, are subject to imputed liability for the negligence of hospital
3 3 This doctrine is
employees 2 through the doctrine of respondeat superior.
the traditional method of imputing liability to employers for employees' torts;
perhaps for this reason, the doctrine is often used by plaintiffs in the hospital
context. For reasons that will appear below, however, respondeat superioris
problematic in the hospital context.
Respondeat superior is agency-based strict liability. 4 No fault of the
principal need be shown to hold the principal liable for the servant's physical
torts.' 5 To establish this derivative liability, however, the plaintiff must carry
a substantial burden of proof in satisfying the technical requirements of
respondeat superior. In the hospital context, the plaintiff must first prove

67-72 and accompanying text.
31. Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1042-43 (Ohio 1990).
32. For present purposes, "employee" is not distinguishablefrom "servant" and the terms will

be used interchangeably. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957); see also id. § 2
cmt. d ("The word 'employee' is commonly used in current statutes to indicate the type of person
herein described as servant."); id. § 220 cmt. g ("In general, [employee] is synonymous with
servant.").
33. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 70, at 501; Southwick, supra note 20, at 1-8.
34. See, e.g., Classen, supra note 20, at 472.
35. "The point is that a causative element of the tort does not create the liability [in the
principal]; it is only the relation of master and servant which creates the liability. The basis of
liability is not any tort rule, but simply the relation of master and servant." HAROLD G.
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 69

(2d ed. 1990).
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malpractice against the physician.3 6 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the
physician is the hospital's agent37 and, third, not only the hospital's agent,
but its servant.38 Finally, the plaintiff must show that the tort occurred within
the scope of the agency.39 Once these technical requirements of respondeat
superior are met, the agent's negligence is imputed to the principal, without
regard to fault on the principal's part.'
By contrast, as already discussed, principals are not liable under
respondeatsuperiorfor the physical torts of independent contractors.41 As a
practical matter, principals such as hospitals do not want to be and should not
be liable for the torts of true independent contractors, who by definition
operate their own businesses, the technical aspects of which are beyond the
control or right of control of the principal and may well be beyond the
principal's understanding.4 2
To aid in the analysis of whether an agent is a servant, as opposed to an
independent contractor, courts take into account various factors, a list of which
is found in the Restatement of Agency.43 Of these, the right to physical

36. A medical malpractice action is essentially a tort action in negligence unless the patient
is relying on a specific warranty of the physician. See Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384
(Ind. 1995); Sciacca v. Polizzi, 403 So. 2d 728 (La. 1981); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 32,
at 185-89.
37.
In order for agency to exist, therefore, one person (the "principal") must
intend that another ("the agent") act on his behalf, the agent must intend
to accept the authority of the principal and act on it, and the intention of
each must be manifest either in words or conduct between them.
23 S.C. JuR. Agency § 2 (1994).
38. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1043. A servant is an agent over the performance of whose duties
the principal has the right to a high degree of physical control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (1957).
39. See Emory Univ. v. Lee, 104 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958); Waynick v. Reardon, 72
S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957) ("A master is
subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment."); see also id. § 2(2); id. § 228 cmt. b ("Proof that the actor was in the general
employment of the master does not of itself create an inference that a given act done by him was
within the scope of employment.").
40. Claire G. Combs, Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Negligence of Independent
Contractorsand Staff Physicians:Criticismsof OstensibleAgency Doctrinein Ohio, 56 U. CIN.
L. REv. 711 n.2 (1987).
41. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
42. In the words of one commentator, "Since the basis of the respondeatsuperiortheory is
the employer's right to control the means and methods of the employee's work, it follows
logically that the employer is not liable vicariously for the tort or the negligence of an independent contractor." Southwick, supra note 20, at 4.
43. Among the factors to be considered to determine whether one is a servant or an
independent contractor are the following:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
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control is widely regarded to be the crucial factor in imputing liability under

respondeatsuperior.4
Because the principal's right to control the tortfeasor is required to support
a finding of liability under respondeat superior, the doctrine is theoretically
problematic in the hospital context. Under the corporate practice doctrine,4"
which is the law of all but two states,46 hospitals have traditionally been
prohibited from practicing medicine.4' If a hospital cannot practice medicine,

(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957); see also Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp.
843 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (discussing its own, similar list of factors in a hospital context).
44. See Fulton v. Quinn, 1993 WL 19674, at *3 (Del. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 1993) (mem.) ("In
order to establish actual agency, it must be shown that the employer/hospital controlled or had
the right to control the physical conduct of the servant/physician in the performance of the servant/physician's work. ... [I]f the requisite right of control does not exist, the physician is
considered an independent contractor and the hospital is generally not liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor.") (citations omitted); Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1042, 1044 n.5; see
also 23 S.C. JUR. Agency § 2 (1994) ("The right of control, and in particular control of the
physical execution of the agent's undertaking, is rightly given prominence in making the
distinction between a servant and a non-servant agent.").
45. For a comprehensive discussion of the corporate practice doctrine, see Jeffrey F. ChaseLubitz, Note, The CorporatePractice of Medicine Doctrine:An Anachronism in the Modem
Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445 (1987).
46. Nebraska and Missouri do not follow the corporate practice doctrine. See Karen A. Butler,
Comment, Health Care Quality Revolution: Legal Landminesfor Hospitals and the Rise of the
CriticalPathway, 58 ALB. L. REv. 843, 864 (1995) (citing Sager v. Lewin, 106 S.W. 581 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1907); State Electro-Medicallnst. v. Nebraska, 103 N.W. 1078 (Neb. 1905)). Like the
majority of states, however, South Carolina historically has adhered to the corporate practice
doctrine. Until the recent advent of the professional corporation statute in South Carolina, a
corporation could not engage in the practice of medicine even through its licensed employees.
Wadsworth v. McRae Drug Co., 203 S.C. 543, 548, 28 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1943) (citing Ezell v.
Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938)); see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-3-101, 40-47-60 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
47. The corporatepractice doctrine, which arose because of historical mistrust of corporations
and concerns about physician autonomy, has been variously inferred from state licensing statutes,
judicially created in case law, and expounded upon in state attorney general opinions. See, e.g.,
Butler, supra note 46, at 863-64; Chase-Lubitz, supra note 45, at 455-67.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss3/3

10

McWilliams and Russell: Hospital Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians
HOSPITAL LIABILITY

1996]

then presumably the hospital cannot control or have the right to control the
professional acts of physicians.4" For their part, physicians are under ethical
constraints to act for the benefit of the patient free from the control of any
nonphysician.4 9 Accordingly, no matter how a physician's relationship to the
hospital is contractually defined, the attending physician is ethically constrained to "act as an advocate and coordinator of care for the patient and
should assume appropriate responsibility." 50 Thus, the prohibition on the
corporate practice of medicine would seem to be a valid defense to hospital
liability under respondeat superior for the malpractice of any physician,
whether an employee of the hospital or a true independent contractor.51
After Bing,52 however, courts have imposed liability on hospitals for the
torts of their employee physicians based on respondeat superior,53 a result
hard to reconcile with the corporate practice doctrine. While such judicial
decisions call into question the continued viability of the doctrine in the
hospital context, the corporate practice doctrine is still used to argue that a
hospital cannot control its nonemployee independent contractor physicians, and

48. Butler, supranote 46, at 863 (citing Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (Colo. 1944));
see also James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider CooperationLegislation, 79 CORNELL L. Rv. 1459, 1471-72

(1994).
49. The physician's independence is intended to insulate the relationship between the patient
and the physician from the business orientation of the hospital. See THOMAS M. GARRETT ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE ETHICs: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 17 (1993).
50. Northern Trust Co. v. St. Francis Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
("Generally, the decision to treat a patient in a particular manner is a medical question entirely
within the discretion of the treating physician and not the hospital."); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
PHYSICIAN'S ETHICS MANUAL 3, 29 (3d ed. 1993); see William C. Anderson, III & Marilee
Clausing, The ExpansionofHospitalLiabilityin Illinois:The Use andAbuse ofApparentAgency,
19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1197, 1232 (1988) (citing Johnson v. Sumner, 513 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1987)).
51. See Banks v. Saint Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 558 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Colo.
1983) (applying Colorado law).
52. Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 6 (N.Y. 1957) (stating that traditionally respondeat
superiorwas not a viable theory of recovery in the hospital context because "[i]t was the court's
thought that, even though employed by the hospital, [nurses and physicians] were to be regarded
as independent contractors rather than employees because of the skill they exercised and the lack
of control exerted over their work"); see Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 975
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("Mhe majority of courts chose to follow... Bing" in applying
respondeatsuperiorto hospitals for torts of medical personnel.).
53. See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529-30 (App. Div. 1976)
(finding, in an emergency room case, that the hospital was liable as the employer of defendant
physician); see also Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (noting, in an HMO case, that it is a non sequitur to conclude that because a hospital,
or HMO, cannot practice medicine, it cannot be liable for the actions of its agents and servants
who are licensed to practice); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) (holding that an HMO, like a hospital, can be liable under respondeatsuperior).
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thus cannot render them servants, because the hospital's control would
constitute the unauthorized practice of medicine." Because of such internal
inconsistencies and selective enforcement of the doctrine, the corporate
practice doctrine has been increasingly criticized as an anachronism and an
obstacle to innovative health care reform." In addition, certain traditional

ethical formulations prohibiting physicians from working for corporations or
on a contract basis have come under fire and have been held to violate federal
antitrust laws. 6
Nevertheless, the theoretical difficulties faced by plaintiffs asserting
respondeat superior continue to be substantial in the independent contractor
area. 57 For example, a traditional application of respondeat superior was
employed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial
Hospital,51 an emergency room case. The court observed that respondeat
superiorapplies only in the master/servant relationship, based primarily on the
master's right of control of the physical conduct of the agency, but also taking
into account such other factors as described in section 220 of the Restatement
of Agency.5 9 The court concluded that the negligent radiologist in that case
was not a servant because, first, in its contract with the radiologist, the
hospital did not reserve any right of control over the radiologist's professional
activities and, second, the radiologist maintained his own office, billing

54. See generally Milliron v. Francke, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (Mont. 1990) (holding that the
general rule of hospital nonliability for the negligence of independent contractor physicians
"'reflect[s] the belief that a physician's knowledge and services are so specialized and personal
that he cannot be controlled by a layman in the practice of his calling.") (quoting 40 AM. JUR.
2D HospitalsandAsylwns § 28 (1968)); see also Anderson & Clausing, supra note 50, at 1206.
55. See, e.g., Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 354 S.E.2d 632, 635 (Ga. Ct. App.)
(stating that for a physician to relinquish control over the time, manner, and method of executing
medical practice in a manner rendering him a servant "'would almost certainly be violative of a
physician's professional ethics'"; therefore, a "literal application" of the doctrine of respondeat
superiorwould render hospitals immune from liability for malpractice), aff'd sub nom. Richmond
County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. 1987); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note

45. But see Frances J. Serbaroli, CorporatePracticeof Medicine:A Clearand PresentDanger,
7 S.P.G. HEALTH LAW. 6 (1994).
56. See In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 980 (1979) (enjoining the AMA from
enforcing ethical prohibitions against physicians' practicing medicine in corporate settings because
of the anticompetitive effect of the AMA's control over economic and organizational aspects of
the practice of medicine), aff'd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
57. No reported South Carolina appellate decision directly applies the doctrine of respondeat
superiorto a hospital for a physician's negligence. S.C. JUR. Hospitals § 15 (1993). However,
in Self v. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349, 354, 387 S.E.2d 713, 716 (Ct. App. 1989), the South
Carolina Court of Appeals stated that the alleged negligence of a physician who is not an agent
or servant of a hospital may not be imputed to the hospital, suggesting that a finding of servant
status for a malpracticing physician could lead to vicarious liability for the hospital.
58. 423 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. 1988).
59. Id. at 852 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957)).
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service, and malpractice insurance and served hospitals other than the
defendant. 60
Despite the continuing viability of the independent contractor rule in cases
involving nonemployee independent contractors, courts have applied
respondeatsuperiorin a number of cases in the physician/hospital context to
hold the hospital liable for the torts of such contractors. 61 There are indications in some cases that this liability may result from careless use of the term
respondeat supeior.6 In several cases, courts have found servant status
based on control of the physician by the hospital through a medical director
(a licensed physician who is also an administrator) or through a committee of
medical directors.6 3 In other cases, courts have concluded as a matter of fact
that general operating guidelines imposed on physicians by hospitals constitute
sufficient control over an alleged independent contractor physician to support
respondeatsuperior liability. ' The weight of authority, however, holds that
such general guidelines, rules, and regulations do not meet respondeat
supeior'srequirement that the principal have the right to control the physical
execution of an agent's duties.'

60. Id. at 852-53.
61. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing the liability of hospitals for the
malpractice of independent contractor physicians under apparent agency).
62. See, e.g., Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985) (stating that an
independent contractor physician may render a hospital liable under respondeatsuperiorwhere
the patient relies on the hospital to deliver health care without regard to physician's identity).
63. By having a physician-administrator oversee other doctors, hospitals can avoid the
prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine yet still wield some influence on doctors'
medical decisions. See, e.g., Schleir v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (finding it significant, in an HMO case, that a malpracticing physician was supervised by
another physician rather than a layman); Sloan, 516 N.E.2d at 1109 (same).
64. In Mduba, an emergency room case, the court stated:
While conducting the operations of the Emergency Room, the doctor was to do so in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the defendanthospital's governing board.
Thus, under the contract, the doctor was not only bound to achieve a certain result,
i.e., direct and supervise the Emergency Room, but was controlled by the defendant
hospital as to the means or manner of achieving this result. Since the hospital
controlledthe mannerin which the doctoroperatedthe Emergency Room, [the doctor]
was not an independentcontractorbut an employee of defendant hospital.
Mduba, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (emphasis added). The quoted words appear to constitute an
indirect statement of a direct duty owed by the hospital, rather than a true agency analysis.
65. See Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Wis. 1992) ("[The hospital] may have
required that physicians ... be members [of its] staff, and required the physicians to comply with
the policies, by-laws, rules, and regulations of [the hospital]. That does not indicate that a masterservant relationship existed."); see also Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1044 ("The mere granting of staff
privileges to an independent private physician, which the hospital may later revoke under its
[review] procedures, does not establish the requisite level of authority or control over such
physician to justify imposing liability [against the hospital] under the doctrine of respondeat
superior."); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., Nos. 12845 & 13060, 1992 WL
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Many hospitals have attempted to bolster agency-based defenses by
shifting performance of certain services from salaried physicians to true
independent contractors. 6 The hospital and physician often explicitly describe
their relationship as that of principal and independent contractor in the contract
for services.67 Additionally, in a well-drafted contract, the independent
contractor physician does not receive a salary from the hospital, and the
contract makes plain that the hospital has no right of control over the physician
in providing professional services.68
Although the belief of the agent and principal about their relationship is
among the factors to be considered in determining agency status, 69 characterizations in employment agreements are far from conclusive in the tort context.
Some courts have denounced the independent contractor designations as selfserving "secret arrangements"7' between physician and hospital, not binding
upon patients or the courts. 7 Even where hospitals have taken steps to
inform patients of the independent contractor status of physicians practicing on
the premises, courts have disregarded the arrangements. 72
211939 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept 4, 1992) (holding that a hospital's by-laws did not constitute
sufficient evidence of the hospital's control over the mode and manner of the emergency room
physicians' provision of care); Pamperin, 423 N.W.2d at 852 (finding respondeatsuperiornot
applicable because "[t]he limited control which [the principal] Trinity has reserved over [the
agent] Lakeview's providing radiological services does not transform [the agent's] relationship
with [the principal] into a master-servant relationship.. . . [,V]e hold as a matter of law that [the
agent] ... is not [the principal's] servant, i.e., [the agent] is an independent contractor.").
66. Southwick, supranote 20, at 9-10.
67. Id. at9.
68. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957); see supra note 43 (listing factors
determinative in deciding whether an agent is a servant or an independent contractor).
70. See, e.g., Fulton, 1993 WL 19674 at *5; Hardy, 471 So. 2d at 371; Arthur v. St. Peter's
Hosp., 405 A.2d 446, 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
71. In Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983), the court stated:
[Ihe hospital must be held accountable for the negligence, if any, of its authorized
emergency room physician regardless of whether or not he is an independent
contractor by secret limitations contained in private contract between the hospital and
doctor or by virtue of some other business relationship unknown to the patient and
contrary to the hospital's conduct and representations.
Id. at 282; see also Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., 582 F.2d 781, 796 (3d Cir. 1978) ("The
issue, we note, is not what agreements were entered into between [principal and agent] to
establish a relationship other than agency, but rather what representations were actually made to
the customers of the ...store."); Fulton, 1993 WL 19674 at *5 ("[it is unfair to allow 'secret
limitations' on liability ... premised on a doctor/hospital contract, to bind the unknowing
patient.") (citing Arthur, 405 A.2d at 447); Mduba, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (same); Kashishian,
481 N.W.2d at 282 (same); Hardy, 471 So. 2d at 371 (discussing as ineffectual the "details of
any undisclosed agreement between the hospital and the person acting in its behalf"); Classen,
supra note 20, at 471 ("Though widely utilized, most courts now view [independent contractor
clauses] as thinly veiled attempts by hospitals to shirk their responsibility to the patient.").
72. Johnson v. Lutheran Hosp., H.C.A. 82-146 (Md. Health Claims Arb. 1984); see also
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These results indicate that, at least in the view of some courts, public
perceptions and patients' reasonable expectations are more important in
assessing hospital liability than are the bargained-for relationship between
hospital and physician and the policies traditionally underlying principal
liability for the negligence of agents. In so deciding, these courts ignore or
overlook the traditional distinction between servant and independent contractor, which is oriented toward allocating to the employer that burden directly
flowing from an employer/employee relationship.73 The judicial focus on
public expectations points in the direction of nondelegable duty, raised by
hospital representations and public policy, as the true informing doctrine in the

respondeatsuperiorcases.74

B. Apparent Agency andEstoppel: Restatement of Agency Section 267
The difficulties posed by the independent contractor rule as an impediment
to hospital liability for independent contractor malpractice have led to
increased judicial emphasis on approaches outside of actual agency. The
approach most similar in appearance to respondeat superior is another form
of vicarious liability, the doctrine of apparent (or "ostensible") agency, 75 and

Fulton, 1993 WL 19674 at *6-7 (stating that disputed inferences even as to plaintiff's admitted,
actual knowledge of physician's agency relationship with a hospital must be taken in light most
favorableto the plaintiff on motion to dismiss); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187,
1190 (Ohio 1980) ("[S]ound public policy demands that the full-service hospital not be permitted
to contractually insulate itself from liability. . . ."); Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 21, at 70001,718.
73. See Dunn, 606 A.2d at 868-69, where the court stated:
[IUt is apparent to us that Health Care Plan of New Jersey is responsible for Dr.
Marmar's actions on theories of respondeatsuperioror agency .... Neither he nor
his group was paid on a fee-for-service basis; rather they were paid on a per capita
basis, based upon the number of subscribers to the HMO. They were not free to
accept or reject a particular patient. Additional referrals were at the HMO's option.
Of course, the HMO could not
They examined decedent at the HMO's office ....
practice medicine and therefore the individual examination and diagnostic decisions
of. . . Dr. Marmar were professional doctor-patient matters. Yet the overall control
exercised by the HMO over [the physician] clearly caused Dr. Marmar to be both
actually and apparently the agent of the HMO .... [These factors] require a finding
of agency.
Id. Compare the analysis employed by the New Jersey Superior Court in Dunn with the factors
listed in note 43, supra, from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957).
74. See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (discussing nondelegable duty).
75. Apparent agency is often confused with "apparent authority." Although both sound alike
and have roots in estoppel, they are very different in context and application. Apparent authority
is defined as "the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's

manifestations to such third persons."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 8 (1957).

Accordingly, apparent authority supplies an agent with the power to bind the principal in contract,
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its close cousin, agency by estoppel.7 6 Decisions holding hospitals liable on
the basis of apparent agency date at least from the California Supreme Court's
decision in 1955 in Seneris v. Haas.7'
Apparent agency and respondeatsuperiorare similar in appearance and
indeed in effect, as both lead to imputed liability for the physical torts of
another. They are fundamentally different, however, in doctrinal underpinning,
a difference that also suggests a difference in application. Respondeat superior
proceeds from the existence of a servant-type agency and reflects the cost
assigned to the principal's choice to act through servants, based upon the
structure of the master/servant relationship. By contrast, apparent agency is
estoppel-based.
Apparent agency is recognized by the Restatement of Agency in section

267:78
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such
apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by
the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent
as if he were such. 9
According to the comments to section 267, "The rule [of section 267]
normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or
protection of an apparent servant in response to an invitation from the
defendant to enter into such relations with such servant."80 Apparent agency

or by representations, but apparent authority has no application in tort. See id. § 8 cmt. d.
Apparent agency, by contrast, estops an assertion of nonagency, in effect supplying the missing
agency, and defines the scope of the agency. Apparent agency can be effective in either contract
or tort. See id. § 267 and comments.
76. "Agency by estoppel," based on the same principles as apparent agency, is traditionally
thought to be limited in application to contracts, as is apparent authority. See Drexel v. Union
Prescription Ctrs., 582 F.2d 781, 791-92 nn.14-15 (3d Cir. 1978); Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud
Hotel, Inc., 634 A.2d 622, 630 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
Some courts take the view that there is no meaningful distinction between apparent agency
and agency by estoppel. See, e.g., Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442, 449
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). However, the Restatement of Agency treats them separately,
describing agency by estoppel in terms of liability and apparent agency in terms of injury.
Compare RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (1957) with id. § 267.
77. 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955) (nominally applying the doctrine of apparent authority and
ruling that when a physician performs a typical hospital function, or when a patient so believes,
the hospital can be liable for injuries resulting from the physician's negligence).
78. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27, 31., 43, 267, 319 (1957).
79. Id. § 267.
80. Id. § 267 cmt. a. Illustrations 3 and 4 of the comments to § 267 provide as follows:
P, a department store, contracts with T, as an independent contractor, to give medical
attention to patrons of the store, T appearingas an employee.... [B]y mistake T
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as described by section 267 is not in any way agency-based. Indeed, where
agency is present, apparent agency is superfluous. Rather, section 267 is based
upon the elements of estoppel: a representation causing justifiable reliance and
resulting harm. It functions when agency does not exist, but to permit a
defense of nonagency would be unfair."
In cases in which respondeatsuperioris inappropriate as a path to hospital
liability for independent contractor physician malpractice, apparent agency as
described in section 267 has become a popular rationale,82 accepted in many
jurisdictions. 3 As an exception to the independent contractor rule, its
application does no violence to that rule, and at the same time it holds the
hospital accountable for the arguably foreseeable results of its mode of doing
business, where fairness so indicates.A

gives poison to a patron of the store, who takes it in the belief that it is medicine. P
is liable for the harm.
Id. § 267 cmt. a., illus. 3-4 (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Combs, supra note 40, at714-15 (statingthat if the elements of apparentagency
are present, "the hospital is estopped from denying that the physician was its agent"); Steven R.
Owens, Note, Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital and the Evolhtion of HospitalLiability:
Wisconsin Adopts Apparent Agency, 1990 Wis. L. RFv. 1129, 1142 n.58 (1990).
82. Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 354 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that "the doctrine of apparent or ostensible agency ... appears to have been adopted ... by the
courts of every other state in which it has been asserted as a basis for liability"). As explained
by one commentator:
[I]n order to impose liability on a hospital under the respondeatsuperioror corporate
negligence theories, either a tort by a servant/agent/employeeor corporate wrongdoing
must exist. Faced with a situation in which neither exists, the plaintiffs' bar was
compelled to rely upon the frequently inadequate resources of private practitioners to
respond in damages. Consequently, the doctrine of apparent agency developed.
See Anderson & Clausing, supra note 50, at 1206.
83. For a representativesampling, see Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Ala. 1987); Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., 272 A.2d
718 (Del. 1970); Irving v. Doctors Hosp., 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied,
422 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1982); Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985);
Mehlman v. Powell, 378 A.2d 1121 (Md. Ct. App. 1977); Arthur v. St. Peter's Hosp., 405 A.2d
446 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App.
Div. 1976); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio 1980); Smith v. St. Francis
Hosp., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 637
P.2d 155 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 450 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980); Edmonds v. Chamberlain Memorial Hosp., 629 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981);
Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); see also Classen, supra
note 20, at 483-88.
84. See generally Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968),
where the court stated:
[RIespondeat superior, even within its traditional limits, rests not so much on policy
grounds consistent with the governing principles of tort law as in a deeply rooted
sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents
which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities .... Put another way,
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For all the doctrine's facial attractiveness, the requisites of apparent
agency-a representation causing reasonable reliance and resulting
harm-would present substantial difficulties for plaintiffs if applied with rigor
by the courts in the hospital context." Confronted with the flowing tide of
changing public perception, however, courts have employed the doctrine
without rigor and, arguably, have much damaged it in the process. It might be
said that these courts have developed a new, policy-based doctrine by loosely
adopting the outlines of traditional apparent agency. The new doctrine cannot
be said to be estoppel-based, because, as will be seen, it lacks the requisites
of estoppel.
A rigorous application of apparent agency should take into account two
of the doctrine's fundamental attributes: its role as a species of estoppel and
its function as the door to fictional agency. These attributes will be discussed
inorder.
Generally speaking, estoppel can proceed either from "some definite
misrepresentation of fact, made with reason to believe that another will rely
upon it,"86 or from silence in the knowledge that another misunderstands the
silence and is acting in reliance on the misunderstanding.' In the latter case,
because the relying party is not actively misled, "the courts have insisted upon
some fault in connection with the conduct of the one to be estopped."88
Where one remains silent "reasonably and in good faith," there is no estoppel;
in order for estoppel to operate the silent party "must realize that the other is
about to act under a mistaken belief."89 Accordingly, estoppel based on
silence requires "either an intent to mislead or unreasonable conduct
amounting to negligence in failing to act."' In short, estoppel, although
founded in fairness, works fairness for a party only where there is some
element of fault in the behavior of the other party. Although apparent agency
leads to imputed liability based on the apparent agent's fault, the estoppel basis
of apparent agency also brings into the doctrine a flavor of fault on the part
of the principal in the form either of an inaccurate representation or of a
failure, unreasonable or not in good faith, to correct a mistaken impression.

[agent] Lane's conduct was not so "unforeseeable" as to make it unfairto charge [his
principal] with responsibility.
Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
85. See, e.g., CoastalEmergency Servs., 354 S.E.2d at 637 (adopting a rule based on section
267 but granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment because of lack of reliance on the
part of the plaintiff).
86. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 105, at 733.
87. Id. at 734.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Apparent authority's flavor of fault and foreseeability on the part of the
putative principal is congruent with the Restatement's two-sided formulation
of the doctrine. Under the Restatement view, the "mere fact" of the belief of
the plaintiff is insufficient to engage the doctrine.9 There must be intentional
misleading, or an unreasonable or bad faith failure to speak after notice, on the
one side, "causing a third party justifiably to rely" upon the apparent agent.'
Section 267 is not, however, a self-executing source of liability. It
operates only to open the door to a fictional application of the normal rules of
agency liability, and these rules inform the required content of representation
and reliance.' This proposition can be discerned in the words of section 267:
Where one represents that another is his "servant or other agent", causing the
plaintiff reasonably to rely on that other's services, the representor is liable for
the acts of the other "as if he were such" servant or other agent-liable, in
other words, to the extent appropriate were the other the kind of agent
represented.' Put another way, apparent agency does no more than estop a
putative principal from employing nonagency as a defense, thereby giving the
plaintiff the opportunity to prove the principal's liability based on agency
rules.
It follows that if the defendant has represented another to be a servant,
causing justified reliance, then the defendant may be liable for that other's
torts as usual under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior; nonagency will not
be a defense, but the elements of respondeatsuperiormust still be proved in
order for the plaintiff to succeed. 9 It also follows that, if the defendant has

91. Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that ostensible
agency does not apply under Missouri law "'simply because the party claiming has acted upon
his conclusions .

. . .'

Thus, a mere subjective assertion of reliance by a third party is not

enough, for it must be judged within objective constraints.") (quoting Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc.
v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 13 (Mo. 1970)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt.
a (1957), which provides:
The mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party believes to be the
defendant's servant is not sufficient to cause the apparent master to be liable. There
must be such reliance upon the manifestation as exposes the plaintiff to the negligent
conduct... . in response to an invitation from the defendant to enter into such
relations with such [apparent] servant.

Id.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 & cmt. a (1957).
93. Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (From apparent agency
"spring[s] the same legal consequences as those which result from an actual agency.") (citations

omitted).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957).
95. See RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a, illus. 3 (1957) (An employer is
liable to the harmed patient for the negligence of an independent contractor physician "appearing
as an employee.") (emphasis added). As discussed earlier, the concept of "employee" is
congruent with that of "servant." See supra note 32. Professor Hynes refers to § 267 as "vicarious liability by estoppel." J. DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 106 (abridged 4th ed.
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represented another to be an agent of the independent contractor variety, then
the defendant will be estopped to deny agency, but the independent contractor
rule will be available as a defense. Under this view, of course, hospital liability
for independent contractor malpractice through apparent agency is a two-step
process: The elements of apparent agency must be met in order to estop the
hospital to deny agency, whereupon the elements of respondeatsuperiormust
96
be proved.
In summary, in order sufficiently to satisfy the traditional requisites of
apparent agency to hold a putative principal liable for the physical torts of an
independent contractor, the defendant must be shown either to have represented the contractor to be his servant (one over whose actions the defendant has
the right of physical control) with reason to believe that the representation
would be relied upon or to have remained silent unreasonably or not in good
faith. Moreover, the plaintiff must thereby have been induced to rely 9l upon
the care or skill of the apparent servant with resulting harm. Finally, the harm
must be within the scope of the agency represented. 9 This is a steep hill for
a hospital patient to climb.
Why should the rule be so cluttered? Consider the policies involved.
Apparent agency is a double fiction: The defendant is estopped to assert the
truth (that the tortfeasor is not his servant) in order to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to invoke the fictional liability of respondeat superior, which is
policy-based liability without fault. 99 If our tort system is indeed fault-based,
as Professor Owen asserts, 1" then the hill of apparent agency is no more
than appropriately steep.
In view of this steepness, it is not surprising that no court assigning
hospital liability for independent contractor malpractice on the nominal basis
of apparent agency has applied the doctrine with rigor. In a thoughtful opinion
focusing on the representation and causation requirements of section 267, the
Ohio Supreme Court determined that, in an emergency room context, there
was "no genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the plaintiff] was induced

1994).

96. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 105, at 733 (When estoppel can be shown,
"the plaintiffprevails, not on the theory that the defendant's misrepresentationis tortious in itself,
but because the defendant is not allowed to assert the truth, which would otherwise be a defense
to some other action.") (emphasis added).
97. See Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1049 (Ohio 1990) ("'The doctrine of
agency by estoppel ... is not applicable where there is no showing of induced reliance upon an
ostensible agency.'") (quoting Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 49 N.E.2d 925, 925 (Ohio
1943)); see also Porter,756 F.2d at 674.
98. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. b (1957).
99. See supra notes 34 & 81 and accompanying text; see generallyAbraham & Weiler, supra
note 20, at 388.
100. See David G. Owen, The FaultPit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703, 703 (1992) ("Fault lies at the
heart of tort law, the private law of wrongs.").
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to rely" on the negligent physician's relationship to the defendant hospital."°
As to the inducement element, in an unusually accurate application of section
267, the court stressed "that the question is whether the plaintiff relied on the
ostensible agency relationship, not whether the plaintiff relied on the reputation
of the hospital."1"m
Other courts, however, assume away or ignore great chunks of the
required analysis. 3 They advance policy justifications for outcomes
favorable to the plaintiff, but such justifications are result-oriented,' °4
hospital-specific, and emanate from the changing public perception of
hospitals. They do not justify rejigging the established doctrine. If these resultoriented policies are justification for anything, is it for the emergence of a
new, hospital-specific doctrine of liability based on public policy. Indeed,
when established doctrines are stretched as section 267 has been, it appears
that the law is moving from the framework of an existing doctrine toward a
new doctrine based on new policies, but that, in grappling with this transformation, the courts have yet to free themselves from the vocabulary of the
existing doctrine.
To the argument that section 267 is in the process of being "streamlined"
or modernized, one could respond that the doctrine as a whole is not being
affected; the most extreme cases of such "streamlining" are not just hospital
101. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1050.
102. Id. at 1049-50. The court noted that, given the situationalpracticalities, "reliance is rarely
present in an emergency situation." Id. at 1050 n.12; accord Porter,756 F.2d at 674 ("For
section 267 to apply, Porter would have had to present evidence that his decision to allow Dr.
Schneider to perform surgery on him was made because he believed that Dr. Schneider was an
agent of St. Joseph Hospital.").
103. See, e.g., Williams v. St. Claire Medical Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
Williams involved the negligence of an independent contractor nurse-anesthetist. In evaluating
hospital liability, the court first discussed apparent authority, then quoted section 267, and
concluded as follows:
In applying the above legal principles... it logically follows that the appellant
justifiably believed Johnson to be a hospital employee. By taking no action to give
appellant notice otherwise, the hospital "held-out" [sic] Johnson as an employee, thus
creating an apparent agency.
Id. at 596. Compare the above-quoted language from Williams with that of Chase v. Independent
Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991):
Standing alone, Ms. Chase's statement.., that she was not "made aware that the
doctors ... were not employees" is insufficient to raise a claim of ostensible
agency... . In order to hold IPA liable under an ostensible agency theory, there
would have to be a showing of reliance on representations by IPA ....
Id. (citation omitted).
104. See, e.g., Adamski, 579 P.2d at 974 ("[A]pplication of hornbook rules of agency to the
hospital-physicianrelationship usually leads to unrealistic and unsatisfactory results, at least from
the standpoint of the injured patient. Consequently, we have seen a substantial body of special
law emerging in this area; the result has been an expansion of hospital liability for negligent
medical acts committed on its premises.").
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cases, but emergency room cases,"° where causation and reliance as a
practical matter are very difficult to prove, and where it is most likely that the
patient is looking to the institution itself for care.lo Where the patient has
time for reflection and therefore for reliance, section 267 is applied more in
accord with its terms.107
C. Nondelegable Duty
The doctrine of nondelegable duty has traditionally been used to describe
a form of vicarious liability,"'8 liability on the part of the delegating party
regardless of any fault on its part.1 9 The doctrine evidently made its
entrance into the hospital malpractice field in Darlingv. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,110 with the Illinois Supreme Court's assertion that a

hospital owes a direct and nondelegable duty to provide for a patient's care,
safety, and management.1 '
The real effect of finding a duty to be nondelegable is to render not the
duty, but the liability, not delegable; the person subject to a nondelegable duty
is certainly free to delegate the duty, but will be liable to third parties for any
negligence of the delegatee, regardless of any fault on the part of the delegator.1 2 The concept has been established at least since 1811:

105. See Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga. 1987) (noting
that section 267 has been most widely applied in emergency room settings).
106. See Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1050 n.12 (stating that "[t]he element of reliance is rarely
present in an emergency situation").
107. E.g., Porter,756 F.2d at 674-75. Plaintiff Porter discussed surgery with a staff physician
and waited two days to make his decision. The court stated:
For section 267 to apply, Porter would have had to present evidence that his decision
to allow Dr. Schneider to perform surgery on him was made because he believed that
Dr. Schneider was an agent of St. Joseph Hospital. This he did not do.... [The]
district court did not err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for St.
Joseph Hospital.
Id.
108. See Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. Partnership v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 962, 967 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989) (en banc).
109. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 511. When the court finds a nondelegable duty,
it will hold the employer liable for the independent contractor's negligence even though the
employer exercised reasonable care. See, e.g., 5 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 26.11, at 83-88 (2d ed. 1986); Classen, supra note 20, at 475.
In some recent hospital cases, however, the term is used much more loosely to apply to
cases in which hospitals are held liable only when they can be shown to have been negligent, and
their negligence to have had a causal relationship to the plaintiff's injury. These cases are
discussed in the next section. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
110. 211 N.E.2d 253 (II1. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
111. See id. at 257-59; Southwick, supra note 20, at 29-31.
112. Foltz v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 376 N.W.2d 301, 309 (Neb. 1985); Feliberty v.
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A person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts upon him
a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching to him of seeing that
duty performed, by delegating it to a contractor. He may bargain with the
contractor that he shall perform the duty, and stipulate for an indemnity
from him if it is not performed, but he cannot thereby relieve himself from
liability to those injured by the failure to perform it. 1
Reflected in this description is the result that, where duties are found to be
nondelegable, liability for harm to the one to whom the duty is owed is not
escaped by delegation to an independent contractor. In other words, the
doctrine of nondelegable duty is an exception to the general rule of nonliability
for the torts of independent contractors. Similarly clear is that nondelegable
duty does not describe direct liability in the sense of breach by or fault of the
delegator; it is a species of vicarious liability, liability for the fault of another
based not on the delegator's fault but on policy considerations.
Nondelegable duty is liability without fault and therefore, in our faultbased tort system, 114 is strong medicine, assigned only on the basis of potent
policy." 5 Nondelegable duties may be created by statute, contract, franchise
or charter, or the common law, 116 the latter category including the identification of inherently dangerous activities. 11 7 Of interest in the present circumstances are duties arising at common law, and the fundamental question is
when will such a duty be found? One commentator has observed, "In general,

Damon, 527 N.E.2d 261, 264 (N.Y. 1988).
113. Ft. Lowell-NSSLtd. Partnership,800 P.2d at 966-67 (citation omitted).
114. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 511.
115.
[A] non-delegable duty operates, not as a substitute for liability based on
negligence, but to assure that when a negligently caused harm occurs, the
injured party will be compensated by the person whose activity caused the
harm and who may therefore properly be held liable for the negligence of
his agent, whether his agent was an employee or an independent contractor.
To the extent that recognition of non-delegable duties tends to insure that
there will be a financially responsible defendant available to compensate for
the negligent harms caused by that defendant's activity, it ameliorates the
need for strict liability to secure compensation.
Barry v. Raskov, 283 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d
513, 515 (Cal. 1968)).
116. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 511.
117. "Inherently dangerous activities" came into the lexicon to describe activities that posed
an inherent threat or danger even when performed with all reasonable care, such as blasting or
keeping vicious animals. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 513. The concept has been
expanded, according to Prosser, "to work which, in its nature, will create some peculiar risk of
injury to others unless special precautions are taken." Id. Prosser treats inherently dangerous
activities as an exception to the independent contractor rule separate from nondelegable duty. But
see Feliberty, 527 N.E.2d at 264 (where the court, discussing the nature and creation of
nondelegable duties, included in its list of nondelegable duties "work contracted for [that] was
inherently or abnormally dangerous.") (citations omitted).
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non-delegable duties are those that the employer is not allowed to transfer to
another because the responsibility to the community is considered so
important.""' Beyond this observation, unfortunately, the cases in which
such duties have been found exhibit no unifying theme. As Professor Prosser
famously observed, "It is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the nondelegable character of such duties may be determined, other than the
conclusion of the courts that the responsibility is so important to the community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another."19 Put
another way, nondelegable duties established by common law are reflections
of particularly significant public policy, as perceived by the courts.
Although a number of courts have used the term "nondelegable duty" to
refer to certain duties owed directly by hospitals to patients, in most such cases
the term is being used not in the traditional sense; rather, the hospital is found
liable for its own negligence in breaching a duty owed directly to the patient,
not for the negligence of an attempted delegee. Those cases are discussed in
Part IV of this paper.
A few courts have, however, applied the doctrine of nondelegable duty in
independent contractor physician malpractice cases. The best known example
is the Alaska Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson v. Power." In Jackson
an accident victim who had been airlifted to the Fairbanks Memorial Hospital
emergency room later brought suit against the hospital on three vicarious
liability theories: enterprise liability, apparent authority, and nondelegable
duty."' The emergency room physician was conceded by the plaintiff to be
an independent contractor." The case exhibits several distinguishing factors.
Fairbanks was "at the time of Jackson's accident.., the only civilian hospital
north of Anchorage providing emergency room services in Alaska."3 In
addition, the hospital conducted "no advertising at all. "14 Finally, at the
time of the accident, Alaska hospital accreditation rules required "acute care"
hospitals, such as Fairbanks, to provide around-the-clock emergency room
physicians."
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's enterprise
liability theory"2 and returned the apparent agency question to the jury. 12
118. Classen, supra note 20, at 475; see also Ft. Lowell-NSSLtd. Partnership,800 P.2d at
967.
119. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 512.
120. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
121. Id. at 1378.
122. Id. at 1379.
123. Id. at 1381.
124. Id.
125. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1382. This regulation was later rescinded. Id.
126. Id. at 1379. For a discussion of enterprise liability, see notes 198-200 and accompanying
text, infra.
127. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1382. The court distinguished between § 429 of the Restatement of
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The essence of the opinion, as indicated by its first paragraph,s is the issue
of nondelegable duty.
Characterization of a duty as nondelegable, the court observed, is based
on a determination of public policy, answering the question whether in light
of the "importance to the community" of emergency room service, a hospital
should be able to escape liability for malpractice under the independent
contractor rule.12 9 The court found expressions of Alaska public policy in
hospital regulations, in particular the accreditation rule. This scheme, the court
determined, "manifests the legislature's recognition that it is the hospital as an
institutionwhich bears ultimate responsibility for complying with the mandates
of the law." 13 ° Accordingly, the court held that "a general acute care
hospital's duty to provide physicians for emergency room care is nondelegable" and that the hospital, being responsible for such physicians, would
be liable for their negligence.131 The court explained this finding of liability
by reference to the role of hospitals themselves:
We are persuaded that the circumstances under which emergency room
care is provided in a modem hospital mandates the rule we adopt today.
Not only is this rule consonant with the public perception of the hospital as
a multifaceted health care facility responsible for the quality of medical care
and treatment rendered, it also treats tort liability in the medical arena in
a manner that is consistent with the commercialization of American
132
medicine.
Jackson strongly states the case for a public-policy informed exception to
the independent contractor rule. Perhaps in part because of the exceptional
circumstances of the case, its holding concerning nondelegable duty has not
been widely followed. 3 The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, in Albain

Torts and § 267 of the Restatement of Agency, but refers to § 429 as "'ostensible' or 'apparent'
agency," and to § 267 as "'[a]gency by estoppel.'" Id. at 1380. This is despite section 267's
reference in comment a to "the apparent servant," and despite the absence in § 429 of any
reference to any holding out of another as an agent. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 267 cmt. a (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). The authors believe that
the court got these terms exactly backward and deplore their continued inverse use in the
literature. As will be seen, the authors believe that § 429 of the Restatement of Torts is much
more in the spirit of nondelegable duty than any form of agency or fictional agency.
128. Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1377.
129. Id. at 1384.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1385. The court limited the holding to emergency rooms, and to circumstances in
which the negligent physician was not the patient's own. Id.
132. Id. at 1385.
133. As noted, some courts attempting to follow Jackson appear to have misunderstood its
premise. See, e.g., Mason v. Labig, No. 87-CA-91, 1989 WL 72234, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App.
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v. Flower Hospital,134 characterized extensions of nondelegable duty to
hospitals employing independent contractors as "misdirected attempts to
circumvent the necessity of proving agency by estoppel [that] confuse the
proper scope of a hospital's duty in selecting competent physicians." 135
Albain goes on to hold, in effect, that the practice of medicine is delegable:
"The practice of medicine in a hospital by an independent physician with staff
privileges does not involve the type of risks and precautions required as
" 136
contemplated by the 'nondelegable duty' exception.
Jackson's rhetoric raises a further, related question. Is medical practice
amenable to the "inherently dangerous" exception to the usual rule of
nonliability for independent contractors? This subdoctrine "seems to be limited
to work in which there is a high degree of risk in relation to the particular
surroundings, or some rather specific risk or set of risks to those in the
vicinity, recognizable in advance as calling for definite precautions. "137
Originally applied to work which was deemed dangerous even if performed
with reasonable care, such as blasting or the keeping of vicious animals, the
doctrine has expanded but is still considered "exceptional. "131
Performance of medical practice has been said not to be dangerous if
performed properly, and therefore is not "inherently dangerous" in the
traditional sense.' 39 Thus, medical practice should be delegable and should

June 29, 1989) (purportedly agreeing "with the Alaska Supreme Court's recent decision wherein
it held a general acute care hospital's duty to provide physicians for emergency room care was
non-delegable, "but nonetheless finding that the hospital itself breached its duty to follow "acceptable standards") (citing Jackson, 743 P.2d 1376).
134. 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
135. Id.at 1047.
136. Id. at 1048 & n.9. The court continued:
This [slection [of the Restatement] has no reference to such a general anticipation of
the possibility that the contractor may in some way be negligent. It is not concerned
with the taking of routine precautions.. . . Such precautions are the responsibility of
the contractor; and if the employer has exercised reasonable care to employ a
contractor who is competent and careful (see § 411), he is not required to provide, in
the contract or otherwise, that the contractor shall take them.
Id. at 1048 n.9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 cmt. b (1965)).
137. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 514.
138. Id.; see W. EDWARD SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 82 (Harry W. Jones ed. 1975) ("A person
who has a duty of due care to protect another cannot, in general, relieve himself of liability for
any harm to the other by delegating his duty to an agent." This concept has been attached to
"'inherently dangerous activit[ies],' such as the demolition of a building, even though the activity
is not an 'ultrahazardous' one which would give rise to strict liability.") (quoting Majestic Realty
Assocs. v. Toti Contracting Co., 149 A.2d 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)).
139. See Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443,445 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)
(stating that "it is doubtful" that the taking of x-rays "would fall within the [inherently dangerous]
exception"); Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y, 595 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 1992) (holding
that performing an electrocardiogram was not an inherently dangerous activity).
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fall within the general rule that "the principal will not be liable to a third party
harmed by his agent if either the agent had a delegable privilege to act, as
where the third party consented to his acting. " " Nevertheless, some courts,
relying on the above-quoted observation by Prosser, have implied that medical
practice is, indeed, inherently dangerous. 41
Other courts, although not going so far as to categorize the practice of
medicine as an inherently dangerous activity, have come close in describing
their perceptions of the public policies involved:
Having undertaken one of mankind's most critically important and
delicate fields of endeavor, concomitantly therewith the hospital must
assume the grave responsibility of pursuing this calling with appropriate
care. The care and service dispensed through this high trust, however
technical, complex and esoteric its character may be, must meet standards
of responsibility commensurate with the undertaking to preserve and protect
the health,
and indeed, the very lives of those placed in the hospital's
1 42
keeping.
Although nondelegability of medical care has not swept the field,143 the
determination of some courts that hospitals are, even under limited circumstances, subject to traditional nondelegable duty reflects changing perceptions
of public policy at the most potent level. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed
in Albain, the movement is "towards imposing strict liability on hospitals" for
medical care of patients. 1"
D. Restatement Section 429: Nondelegability Based on Reliance
The Restatement of Torts includes a topic entitled "Harm Caused by
Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent Contractor." This topic, the
theme of which is nondelegability of duties, would seem a natural starting
place for plaintiffs seeking to avoid the independent contractor rule. Portions
of this subject matter already have been discussed. Of specific interest, and

140. SELL, supra note 138, at 83 ("Where the agent had a privilege to act and could exercise
that privilege on behalf of the principal, the principal will also escape liability.").
141. See Marek v. Professional Health Servs., 432 A.2d 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
(quoting KEETON, ET AL., supra notes 3 & 119, § 71, at 512).
142. Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (citing
Darling, 211 N.E.2d 253).
143. See Milliron v. Francke, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (Mont. 1990) ("Jackson appears to stand
alone as the only case applying the nondelegable duty exception to employer nonliability to a
hospital for a doctor's negligence."); Abraham & Weiler, supra note 20, at 389 ("Only the
Alaska Supreme Court has explicitly held that the hospital's legal responsibility for malpractice
by its physicians is non-delegable and non-waivable.").
144. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1046.
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now warranting separate discussion, is section 429, so similar in import to
section 267 of the Restatement of Agency that the two are very often cited
together in hospital cases. 45 They share fundamental characteristics: both are
informed by estoppel and both are doctrines of vicarious liability, with liability
for the actions of nonservants waiting at the finish line. The basis of liability
under section 429 is very different, however, having the effect of substantially
lowering the hurdles facing a section 429 plaintiff. Significantly, the policybased rhetoric encountered in many nominal section 267 cases fits nicely into
section 429.
Section 429 provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such
services, to the same extent as though the employer were supplying them
himself or by his servants. 46
The estoppel basis of section 429 is clear. 47 The fault component lies in the
requirement of near-deceit concerning the provider of the proffered services.
The section stands for the proposition that, at least as to physical harm, the
purchaser should have the benefit of the bargain struck.
Fundamentally, section 429 is a variety of nondelegable duty, as indicated
by its inclusion in Chapter 15, Topic 2 of the Restatement. Although the rule
of section 429 has been referred to as "ostensible agency" 14 by some courts
and commentators, the section itself does not base liability on any appearance
or representation of agency. Liability is based upon the reasonable belief of the
plaintiff that the services in question would be performed by the defendant (or
the defendant's alter ego, its servant). 49 Nondelegability is founded upon the
defendant's undertaking to provide those services' 0 and the patient's
reasonable expectations created thereby.'

145. E.g., Mason v. Labig, No. 87-CA-91, 1989 WL 72234 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 1989)
(relying on both apparent agency and on nondelegable duty); Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys. v.
Smith, 822 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (same).
146. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
147. See Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
148. E.g., Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 450 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
149. E.g., id. at 650 ("Mhe jury could have concluded that [the plaintiff] relied upon the
hospital rather than [the individual physician] himself for treatment.").
150. The analogous provision of the law of agency would be the concept of the agent's
agent-a further agent engaged by an agent who has no authority to delegate and is accordingly
liable to the principal for harm caused by the agent's agent. See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra
note 35, § 8, at 20-21.
151. See, e.g., Arthur, 405 A.2d 443. In discussing § 429, the Arthur court stated:
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The point is aptly illustrated by Marek v. ProfessionalHealth Services,' where the plaintiff was injured on the job and was sent to the defendant, "PHS," for diagnosis. PHS arranged for an independent contractor
physician to conduct the diagnosis, which was performed negligently. The trial
court found that PHS was liable as a matter of law, despite its use of an
independent contractor, and PHS appealed. On appeal the Appellate Division
of the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that "the duty assumed by PHS to
plaintiff... was a nondelegable duty."' 53 The court observed that PHS had
undertaken to provide services to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff neither knew
of nor had any choice in the selection of the contractor, and that the plaintiff
should not be required to seek a remedy against a contractor who could be
under-insured or amenable to suit only in some foreign forum. 54 The court
then quoted section 429 in full, referring to it as "another" exception, recognized by the Restatement, to the independent contractor rule. 5 In other
words, the court's analysis and justification in finding liability under section
429 were the same as that used in finding a nondelegable duty.
As a variety of nondelegable duty, section 429 has significant advantages
over section 267 in the physician/hospital context. First, it is self-executing.
Whereas section 267 merely removes nonagency as a defense to proof of
liability under agency doctrine, section 429 requires proof only that the
plaintiff reasonably believed that the defendant was to provide the services,
and that the one who in fact provided them was negligent." In effect,
section 429 embodies the conclusion that the plaintiff should not have to prove
agency, or even liability under agency principles, when his expectation was
52

The logic of these cases is persuasive, particularly when examined in terms of what
may be viewed as the reasonable expectations of the public. This court may take
judicial notice that generally people who seek medical help through the emergency
room facilities of modem-day hospitals are unaware of the status of the various
professionals working there.... [Rather,] it is the reputation of the hospital itself
upon which he would rely .... [and] it would be natural for him to assume that these
people are employees of the hospital.. . . At the very least, a factual question is
presented.
Id. at 447. Earlier in its opinion, the court had noted:
[Section 429] imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual
relationship but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists. The concept is essentially one of estoppel ....
Id. at 446. Thus, "absent notice to the contrary," the plaintiff had a right to assume that the
physician was an employee and the hospital would be responsible for harm. Id. at 447.
152. 432 A.2d 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
153. Id. at 542.
154. Id. at 542-43.
155. Id. at 543.
156. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 & cmt. c (1965).
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that the service would be provided, and presumably warranted by, the
defendant.
Section 429 has the further advantage over section 267 of not requiring
proof either of any representation that the tortfeasor was a servant or of
reliance on such a representation. The representation requirement of section
267 has been a particular obstacle, which courts, presumably in response to
157
perceived public policy, have been nimble to avoid. In Fulton v. Quinn,
for example, the plaintiff was on notice that the treating physician was an
independent contractor, 15s seemingly negating the possibility of representation and causation. The Superior Court of Delaware characterized this notice
as merely evidence of the hospital/physician relationship. The court reduced
the requirements of representation and causation to the "critical question"
whether "a hospital nurtured the patient's belief, even if by mere acquiescence, that the doctor was the hospital's agent."159 This question was then
reduced even further by the court's suggestion that it agreed with the proposition that "absent notice to the contrary, a patient has a right to assume that the
treatment received in a hospital's emergency room is being rendered through
hospital employees and that any negligence associated with that treatment
renders the hospital responsible." 160 Even in the motion-to-dismiss context,
the Delaware court's logic tortures the requirements of section 267.161
Section 429 would be a better fit, focusing as it does not on the apparent legal
relationship between hospital and doctor, of which the patient would almost
certainly not be aware,162 but on the reasonable perceptions of the plaintiff.
The better fit of section 429 to hospital independent contractor cases is
illustrated by Arthur v. St. Peters Hospital.163 In that case of first impression
in New Jersey, brought by an emergency room patient, the court discussed
estoppel based on "the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow
misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority

157. 1993 WL 19674 (Del. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 1993) (mem.).
158. Id. at *6.
159. Id. at *5 (citing Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
160. Id. at *6 (citing Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985)).
161. Silence can constitute a "representation" for purposes of § 267, but only when it is
unreasonable or in bad faith after notice to the hospital that its silence is being inappropriately
relied upon. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. The Restatement itself discourages
application of apparent agency upon the "mere fact" of the plaintiff's belief; it calls for an
"invitation" and reasonable reliance thereon. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 &
cmt. a (1957); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
162. Cf. Fulton, 1993 WL 19674, at *5 ("[B]oth courts and commentators now often
characterize as 'absurd' the requirement that a patient ...be familiar with the law of respondeat
superior and inquire as to the status of each physician from whom treatment is received.")
(citations omitted).
163. 405 A.2d 443.
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exists." 64 For this proposition the court rather questionably relied on a case
concerning the apparent authority of an agent to bind his principal in
contract. 165 The court then quoted section 429, holding:
In those cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has
held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a
patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief
hospital, then the hospital will be
that it is being rendered in behalf of the
6
liable for the physician's negligence.'1
The court's focus on the words "holding out," or representations, is not
dissimilar from the language of many cases nominally based on section 267.
Section 267 does not fit here, however, because the hospital did not represent
anyone as its servant, and there was no reliance upon such a representation.
Section 429 is a better fit both by its terms and as a matter of policy. The
plaintiff in Arthur was not injured because he was misled into believing that
someone was someone else's servant. Rather, he was injured because he
submitted himself to the hospital for a cure. The outcome in Arthur is
consistent with the emerging public perception that the hospital itself is the
provider of services.
As a justification for a hospital exception to the independent contractor
rule, section 267 is unsatisfactory because, ultimately, it assigns liability on
the agency principle that one who controls the physical performance of
another's duties should be liable for resulting harm-liability based on the
structure of the relationship. Put another way, section 267 suggests that when
an employer extends the reach of his competence by employing agents over
whose physical acts he retains a right of control, part of the price he pays is
liability for the agent's physical torts. If the agent is the extension of the
master, the agent's torts are the master's torts. Where courts find as a fact,
however, that a physician is an independent contractor, liability should not
result from the structure of the relationship absent the demanding requisites of
estoppel: The defendant's inaccurate (and in some degree wrongful) representation of a master/servant relationship must cause the plaintiff's reliance on the
1 The hospital exception to the independent
skill of the apparent servant. 67
contractor rule, however, is based on the plaintiff's reliance on the hospital,
not the physician, as the source of cure. Where the courts are satisfied that this
reliance is justified, liability may be available under section 429 without

164. Id. at 446.
165. Id. (citing Hudson & Co. Loan Ass'n v. Horowytz, 186 A. 437, 438 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1936)); see supra note 75 (discussing the distinction between apparent authority and apparent
agency).

166. Arthur, 405 A.2d at 446.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
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requiring a court to be creative concerning the law of master and servant or
representation and causation.
Although section 429 is often cited in cases holding hospitals liable for
malpractice, courts have rarely relied upon it independent of section 267. In
opinions in which both sections are cited, the holding is most often premised
on some variation on the theme of "holding out," 168 which, Jackson v.

Power69 notwithstanding, is much more the premise of section 267 than
section 429. At least one court has rejected section 429 as a basis for hospital
malpractice liability in favor of section 267.170 The less well-fitting theory
is the more popular.
IV. DIRECT LIABILITY
A. Direct Liability Based on HospitalNegligence
Direct hospital liability is based on breach by the hospital of some duty
owed directly to the patient.' 7 ' From that simple description, direct negligence would appear straightforward, but this appearance is scotched by the
lack of uniformity among courts applying the concept. The direct liability

concept is evolving to reflect the changing public perception of the role of the
hospital and the courts' increasing acceptance of this perception. Two general
areas of confusion appear in the cases: What duties are owed directly by the
hospital to the patient, and what is the nature of these duties? The latter
question again raises issues of nondelegable duty and inherently dangerous
activities.
A hospital's nondelegable duties have generally been classified into four
areas:

168. The Arthur court, for example, nominally relied on section 429. It held:
In those cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a
particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted
treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf
of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician's negligence....
"Patients entering the hospital through the Emergency Room, could properly assume
that the treating doctors and staff of the hospital were acting on behalf of the
hospital."
Arthur, 405 A.2d at 44647 (quoting Mdubav. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div.
1976).
169. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
170. Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
171. See, e.g., Williams v. St. Claire Medical Ctr., 657 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)
(noting that where a negligent physician was the plaintiff's private physician, the hospital may
not be liable for the physician's negligence but that such result "has no bearing on the separate
issue of whether the hospital itself was negligent in failing to enforce its anesthesiologypolicies").
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(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate

facilities and equipment;
(2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians;
(3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as
to patient care; and
adequate rules and policies to
(4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce
72
patients.
the
for
care
quality
ensure

Hospitals have also been held directly liable for the failure of employees to
follow physicians' instructions concerning medical care 73 and to keep the
attending physician informed of a patient's condition to permit appropriate
diagnosis and treatment. 74
Where vicarious liability may be impossible to prove, a breach of direct
duties imposed on hospitals may permit plaintiffs to reach a hospital in
connection with the malpractice of independent contractor physicians. 75
Unlike some theories of vicarious liability, direct liability applies with equal
force regardless of whether the patient was treated by a physician who was the
hospital's employee, the hospital's independent contractor staff physician, or
the patient's personal physician. '76
Hospitals' duties to furnish adequate facilities and equipment and to
promulgate and follow rules for patient safety are relatively well-established. 77 The more significant of the two duties in the present context is the
promulgation and administration of patient safety rules, as it can be employed
either cumutively or as a substitute to permit a plaintiff to hold a hospital
directly liable for the malpractice of a physician whose torts would otherwise

172. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (citations omitted); see
McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization, 604 A.2d 1053, 1058-59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(applying the concept to IMOs); see also Abraham & Weiler, supra note 20, at 389-92; Janulis
& Hornstein, supra note 21, at 702-08; Southwick, supra note 20, at 17-44.
173. Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1050 (Ohio 1990).
174. Id. at 1051 (citing Lambert v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 369 N.W.2d 417, 420
(Iowa 1985)). Additionally, "it must be... shown that such breach was the proximate cause of
the patient's injury before the hospital will be held vicariously liable therefore." Id.
175. "[C]orporate liability is broader than agency liability in the sense that the hospital may
be held liable even if the physician (for example, an obstetrician) was selected by the patient and
practices in the hospital as an independent contractor." Abraham & Weiler, supra note 20, at
389-90; see also Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Joiner v. Mitchell
County Hosp. Auth., 186 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971), aft'd, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972);
Holton v. Resurrection Hosp., 410 N.E.2d 969 (ill. App. Ct. 1980); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d
391 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 269 S.E.2d 621 (N.C. 1980); Hannola v. City of Lakewood,
426 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
176. See, e.g., Williams, 657 S.W.2d at 594 ("There is no rational reasonor publiepolicy why
a hospital's [direct] duty to properly administer its policies should be any less to one patient than
another depending upon how the patient initially arrived at the hospital.").
177. See generally supra note 172.
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not be attributable to the hospital. For example, failure of a hospital's
governing board to implement an operating certification committee to
supervise physician practice within the hospital might constitute a negligent
breach of a direct
duty to patients, rendering the hospital liable to a victim of
7

malpractice.1

1

Negligent admission of physicians to staff privileges, often referred to as
"negligent selection," is a more controversial source of hospital liability.
Negligence in engaging agents, including independent contractors, is a familiar
source of direct liability for principals, 9 recognized, for example, in the
Restatements of Agency"80 and Torts.' In such cases, the principal is
responsible for its own negligence, not that of employees or contractors, and
the principal's negligence must be shown to be a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury."
In a number of jurisdictions hospitals have been held to owe a similar,
direct duty to patients to exercise care in selecting physicians to practice on the
premises." The crucial distinction to be made, however, is that physician
selection, which involves professional medical judgments normally exercised
by physician committees,"8 4 is not necessarily the same thing as the hospital's engaging an agent. Courts have only infrequently made this distinction.
In Joiner, for example, the trial court granted summary judgment to a hospital

178. See Bost, 262 S.E.2d 391; see also Southwick, supra note 20, at 24-29.
179. See, e.g., Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. Partnership v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 962, 966-967 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989) (en bane); Greening v. School Dist., 393 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1986).
180. The Restatement of Agency states: "A person conducting an activity through servants or
other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or
reckless in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk or
harm to others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(b) (1957).
181. The Restatement of Torts states that "[alan employer is subject to liability for physical
harm to third persons caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and
careful contractor to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and
carefully done." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411(a) (1965).
182. Greening, 393 N.W.2d at 58 (holding that "a plaintiff must not only show that the
employer negligently selected a person incapable of performing the work but also show that the
conduct of the incompetent employee was a proximate cause of injury to another"); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411
cmt. b. (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 511.
183. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I11.1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 21, at 702-08; Southwick, supra
note 20, at 17-44.
The theory of corporate negligence supported in Darlinghas been expanded by other courts
to hold a hospital liable for failure to exercise due care in selecting and monitoring staff. See,
e.g., Purcell,500 P.2d at 335; Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 307; Holton, 410 N.E.2d at 969; Hannola,
426 N.E.2d at 1187; Southwick, supranote 20, at 17-45; see generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8101 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
184. See generallySouthwick, supra note 20, at 29-44.
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on the ground that the medical staff, not the hospital, was responsible for
granting staff privileges to the physician in question."8 The Georgia Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the question of whether the
hospital itself had been negligent, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 18 6 Similarly, where a review of a physician's practice record would
have revealed questions concerning competence, but no review was made
before the physician was granted surgical staff privileges, the selecting hospital
was held liable by a Wisconsin court for negligence in selection." s The
court determined that the duty to investigate was the hospital's and that the
failure to investigate gave rise "to a foreseeable risk of unreasonable
harm."188 The Ohio Supreme Court has allocated the duty of selection to the
hospital itself." 9 Hospitals also have been held subject to a direct duty of
care in renewing staff privileges, a duty analogous to that of careful selec19
tion.
Related to but more controversial than the duty of care in renewing staff
privileges is the direct duty to supervise physicians practicing on the
premises.191 The duty to supervise has been described as the requirement of
an effective mechanism "to monitor. . . the treatment which is prescribed and
administered by physicians practicing at the facility." 92 At least one
thoughtful opinion has suggested a higher level of duty to monitor in the
emergency room.' 93

185. Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 307.
186. Id. at 308-09 ("[IThe plaintiffdoes not seek to hold the [hospital] liable under the doctrine
of respondeatsuperioror principal and agent, but upon the doctrine of independent negligence
in permitting the alleged negligent physician to practice his profession in the hospital, when his
incompetency is known.").
187. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
188. Id. at 164.
189. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1045.
190. Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
191. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1045.
192. Bost, 262 S.E.2d at 396; see Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 352 S.E.2d 902
(N.C. Ct. App.), aff'd, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 673
(Wyo. 1988) ("[A] hospital should be required to exercise reasonable care not only in
determining whether to extend or continue staff privileges, but also in maintaining adequate
supervision and review of treatment rendered by those physicians.. .. [Hospitals] may be liable
for negligent supervision ... only if [the plaintiff] can demonstrate obvious negligence or show
that the hospital knew or should have known of negligent treatment or procedures.").
A hospital clearly does have a duty to prevent a physician's malpractice at
193.
least to the extent that it establishes procedures for the granting of staff
privileges and for the review of these privileges.. . . [A] hospital may well
have a more specific and precise independent duty in the emergency
room ... to monitor the treatment procedures and medical care provided
patients.
Hannola, 426 N.E.2d at 1192.
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Why the hospital, a corporate entity, should be burdened with liability for
evaluating physician performance is not always clearly dealt with in the cases.
In Albain, the Ohio Supreme Court treated the duty as directly analogous to
any other employment of independent contractors and therefore relied on the
Restatement of Torts section 411.194 This approach begs the question of
whether granting staff privileges is the same thing as hiring an employee. In
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital,95 a case of first impression in New
Jersey, the Superior Court relied on Hull v. North Valley Hospital 96 for this
proposition:
[TMhe integration of a modem hospital becomes readily apparent as the
various boards, reviewing committees, and designation of privileges are
found to rest on a structure designed to control, supervise, and review the
work within the hospital. The standards of hospital accreditation, the state
licensing regulations, and [a hospital's] bylaws demonstrate that the medical
profession and the other responsible authorities regard it as both desirable
and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care of
197
the patient.
This analysis, relied upon in at least three states as a basis for hospital
liability for physician selection, has the ring of enterprise liability.198 Under
this approach, the aggregate ofjural persons, associations, and committees that
come together at a hospital are in truth one, and therefore their framework, the
hospital, justifiably is liable for the actions of all. 199 Enterprise liability

194. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1045; see supra note 181.
195. 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
196. 498 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1972).
197. Corleto, 350 A.2d at 537 (quoting Hull, 498 P.2d at 143); see Darling, 211 N.E.2d at
257 (finding it "both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the
care of the patient").
198. It is useful to compare Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970 (Wash. Ct. App.
1978):
When ... the hospital undertakes to provide medical treatment rather than merely
serving as a place for a private physician to administer to his patients, the physician
employed to deliver that service for the hospital may be looked upon as an integral
part of the total "hospital enterprise." In such cases, it should make no difference that
the physician is compensated on some basis other than salary or that he bills his
patient directly. These are artificial distinctions, the efficacy of which has long since
disappeared and to the perpetuation of which we do not subscribe.
Id. at 975.
199. Enterprise liability was rejected as a basis for hospital liability in Jackson v. Power, 743
P.2d 1376, 1378-79 (Alaska 1987). The theory advanced in Jackson was that an act by an
independent contractor "for the benefit of or in the interest of the enterprise" renders the
enterprise liable. Id. at 1379. Treating enterprise liability as a shortcut to respondeatsuperior
liability, the Alaska Supreme Court observed that "we have applied the theory of respondeat
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carries with it a strong element of liability without fault. It is for this reason,
perhaps, that direct liability is sometimes described in terms of nondelegable
duty, as is discussed below. In any event, the foregoing analysis illustrates
clearly the changing public image of the hospital and the increasing burden of
duty applied by the courts in response thereto. One is tempted to conclude that
the real source of the hospital's duties is that public policy, expressed through
accrediting and other governing regulations, puts the responsibility and
therefore the duty on the hospitals, as suggested in Jackson v. Power.2
In the general run of cases, liability based on negligent selection or

supervision is not treated as imputed liability for physician malpractice, 201

although damages for breach of the duty might be measured similarly. They
are theories of fault-based, direct negligence,2 recognizing an independent
duty, owed directly by the hospital to patients, to scrutinize the qualifications
of its physicians with an acceptable level of care. 2 3 They require the
plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the hospital in the selecting or
supervising process.' Particularly where the hospital's alleged negligence
is not active, but constitutes a failure to act, foreseeability of the harm that
resulted is required.'s The hospital's negligence must also be causally

superioronly in an employer/employee context, unless one of the well established exceptions to
that rule exists." Id. The court did identify two cases and one article promoting the doctrine. Id.
(citing Aldan v. Providence Hosp., 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Adamski, 579 P.2d at
977 & n.5; Southwick, supra note 20, at 3-5).
200. Id. at 1384-85.
201. See Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1046 ("A physician's negligencedoes not automatically mean
that the hospital is liable, and does not raise a presumption that the hospital was negligent in
granting the physician staff privileges."). In addition to showing that the hospital was negligent
in its selection, the plaintiff must show that the conduct of the one selected was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. Cf. Greening, 393 N.W.2d at 58.
202. Corleto, 350 A.2d at 536-37. According to the Restatement of Agency, the finding must
rest upon a finding that the employer has acted unreasonably:
One who employs another to act for him is not liable under the rule stated in this
Section merely because the one employed is incompetent, vicious, or careless. If
liability results it is because, under the circumstances, the employer has not taken the
care which a prudent man would take in selecting the person for the business in hand.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. d (1957).
203. Washington, for example, has recognized what its courts describe as a nondelegableduty
of hospitals to patients to "exercise reasonable care to ensure that only competent physicians are
selected as members of the hospital staff." Alexander v. Gonser, 711 P.2d 347, 351 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986).
204. Corleto, 350 A.2d at 536-37; see Abraham & Weiler, supra note 20, at 391. In Johnson,
for example, the court cast the hospital's duty in terms of foreseeability of harm to patients. The
burden of proof of foreseeability rested with the plaintiff. The hospital was not strictly liable or
held to absolute knowledge of the physician's background; it could have defended itself by
showing a reasonable level of care. See Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 156.
205. Corleto, 350 A.2d at 538 (citing Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299 (N.Y.
1967)); see Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164.
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related to the plaintiff's injury. 2 6 In Douglas v. Freeman,2 7 the patient
was treated by an unlicensed dentist without the assistance of a dental assistant
or supervision by a licensed dentist. The court, focusing on the lack of
proximate cause, stated, "Despite this evidence of negligence, however, the
record is devoid of any testimony establishing that [the dental clinic's]
negligence proximately caused Douglas' injury .... The evidence does not
establish that the absence of a dental assistant, a supervising dentist, or a
licensed dentist caused Douglas' injury. "208
That the duty in such cases is increasingly placed upon the hospital
reflects the courts' growing view that the public looks to the hospital for
treatment and that it is the hospital's responsibility to provide it. 201 In
Johnson, for example, the court cast the hospital's duty in terms of foreseeability of harm to patients, reflecting the court's view that the hospital is not
an arena for physicians to practice, but an institution that itself admits patients
for treatment for which it has the responsibility.
B. DirectLiability Nominally Based on Nondelegable Duty
Corporate negligence is sometimes described in terms of nondelegable
duties.21 0 Unfortunately, insufficient discipline is exercised by courts and
commentators in the use of this term. The term nondelegable duty has
traditionally been used to describe a form of vicarious liability,211 liability
on the part of the delegating party regardless of any fault on its part.21 2 In
recent hospital cases, however, the term is used much more loosely to apply
to cases in which hospitals are held liable only when they can be shown to
have been negligent, and when their negligence can be shown to have had a
causal relationship to the plaintiff's injury. In Douglas v. Freeman,2 a for

206. Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1051 ("[lIt must further be shown that such breach was the
proximate cause of the patient's injury before the hospital will be held vicariously liable
therefor.").
207. 787 P.2d 76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
208. Id. at 80-81.
209. See, e.g., Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 673 (noting that "the preservation of quality health care
for Wyoming citizens was an important public policy") (citations omitted).
210. See David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trendof CorporateLiability:Courts' Uneven
Treatment of HospitalStandardsLeaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV.
535, 540-46 an. 33, 38, 87 (1994).
211. See Ft. LowelI-NSS Ltd. Partnership v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 962, 967 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989) (en banc).
212. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 71, at 511. When the court finds a nondelegable duty,
it will hold the employer liable for the independent contractor's negligence even though the
employer exercised reasonable care. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 109, § 26.11, at 8388; Classen, supra note 20, at 475.
213. 787 P.2d 76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
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example, the Court of Appeals of Washington began with the observation,
"Under the doctrine of corporate negligence, a hospital owes a nondelegable
duty directly to the patient to 'exercise reasonable care to ensure that only
competent physicians are selected as members of the hospital staff.''214 The
court went on to observe that there was ample evidence of the defendant
clinic's negligence in permitting a nonlicensed dentist to perform extractions." 5 Overturning a jury verdict for the plaintiff, however, the Court of
Appeals absolved the clinic from liability because of a lack of adequate causal
connection between the clinic's negligence and the patient's injury.216 The
court distinguished Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,'7 where the "plaintiffs
clearly established that but for the defendant's negligence" the harm to the
patient would not have occurred. In contrast, the Douglasplaintiff "established
cause only with respect to [the physician's] alleged negligence. None of
[plaintiff's] witnesses testified that the alleged negligence of [the clinic] caused
the... injury."28 This sort of analysis falls far short of liability regardless
of the fault of the delegator.
Similarly, Thompson v. Nason Hospital 9 describes four categories of
nondelegable duties for breach of which a hospital' can be found liable
"independently of the negligence of its employees or ostensible agents.""
But Thompson goes on to require plaintiffs to show that the hospital itself
breached a duty and that the hospital knew or should have known of the
negligent acts.m The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in construing Thompson,
concluded that "a hospital's corporate negligence will be measured against
what a reasonable hospital under similar circumstances should have done....
Thompson does not propound a theory of strict liability .... Though broadly
defined, Thompson liability is still fault based."'

214. Id. at79 (quoting Alexander v. Gonser, 711 P.2d 347, 351 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) and
citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984)).
215. Id. at 80.
216. Id. at 81.
217. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
218. Douglas, 787 P.2d at 80.
219. 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
220. Although Thompson speaks in terms of "hospitals," the holding has been applied to the
extent appropriate to an HMO using no facilities or equipment, and therefore not "oversee[ing]... patient care." See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization, 604 A.2d
1053, 1059 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). The duties of selection and retention of competent physicians
and adopting and enforcing appropriate rules and policies have been extended to HMOs. See id.;
see also supra note 1.
221. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707.
222. Id. at 708.
223. Edwards v. Brandywine Hosp., 652 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
4
granting summary judgement for the hospital in Engel v. Minissale,m
quoted Thompson for the proposition that in a corporate negligence action "a
plaintiff must 'show that the hospital had actual or constructive knowledge of
the defect or procedures which created the harm and that the hospital's
negligence must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm.'"' In its discussion of the duties recognized by Thompson, the court
did not describe them as nondelegable. 6
Again, in Mason v. Labig, an unpublished Ohio Court of Appeals
opinion, 7 the court, observing that "[s]ound public policy considerations
require that the full service hospital be held accountable for emergency room
malpractice,"' concluded, "We agree with the Alaska Supreme Court's
recent decision [in Jackson v. Power] wherein it held [that] a general acute
care hospital's duty to provide physicians for emergency room case was nondelegable."' 9 In its discussion of the breach for which hospital liability was
sought, however, the court determined that the hospital deviated from
acceptable standards in not ensuring that an appropriate consultant was
available to the emergency room. In other words, the hospital had itself been
negligent in performing a duty that it owed directly. This is direct liability, not
vicarious liability for the tort of another regardless of the delegator's fault.
The conclusion is difficult to escape that courts such as those that decided
Mason and Thompson are not using "nondelegable" in the traditional sense,
but in the sense that hospitals cannot, by delegating patient care to independent
contractors, escape liability for their own negligence in performing directly
owed duties. As illustrated by the cases above, this approach requires the
plaintiff to prove the hospital's duty and breach, and that the hospital's
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.2uo That the
term "nondelegable" is used at all, however, reflects the trend of public
reliance on the hospital itself as the care provider and therefore as the

224. No. CIV. A. 90-4400, 1995 WL 478506 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 1995).
225. Id. at *2.
226. Id. at *1.
227. 1989 WL 72234 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 1989).
228. Id. at *12.
229. Id. (citing Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987)).
230. Whether the duties discussed in this section are nondelegable in the traditional sense
would come into focus in cases where the hospital delegated the duty in question to an
independent body, such as a physician committee, then defended on the basis of the independent
contractor rule. In Albain the Ohio Supreme Court observed: "The hospital may delegate this
duty [to grant and continue staff privileges] to a staff physician committee, but it cannot escape
its duty of due care in the process of granting and continuing staff privileges by doing so." Albain
v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045 (Ohio 1990). This statement can be read to refer to
traditional nondelegable duty, or to charge the hospital with supervision of the staff committee's
work.
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responsible party, 1 driving perceived public policy toward enhanced
hospital responsibility for the fate of patients.
V. SHULER AND STRICKLAND

Two recent decisions illustrate that South Carolina courts have not been
unaffected by the general trend toward expansion of hospital liability for the
torts of independent contractor physicians committed on hospital premises.
Shuler v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center, 2 the earlier of the two South
Carolina cases recognizing apparent agency, addresses three points of appeal
but is able to deal with them in five paragraphs. Nondelegable duty, argued
at trial, was not preserved for appeal. Actual agency, raised on appeal, was
supported by "no evidence" in the trial record. z3 Shuler treats apparent
agency as the real issue; the doctrine was familiar in South Carolina in
nonhospital contexts." The court read established precedent as mandating
a three-part test: "To establish an apparent agency. . . [the plaintiff] must
prove: (1) that the purported principal consciously or impliedly represented
another to be his agent; (2) that there was a reliance upon the representation;
and (3) that there was a change of position to the relying party's detriment."23s The court found nothing in the trial record to evidence reliance by
the plaintiff on any manifestation by the defendant?" and sustained summary
judgment. This is a relatively rigorous application of apparent agency in the
hospital context. It is consistent with the reasoning in similar Georgia
237

cases.

Shuler was followed in Strickland, a case that stimulated a rather more
formal opinion. In Strickland the plaintiff agreed that the physician in question
was an independent contractor 38 and sought to hold the hospital liabile on
the basis of apparent authority. Citing the Shuler test, the court declined to
consider whether a fact question had been raised as to the hospital's representation, because in any event there was "no evidence to support the remaining

231. See, e.g., Pedroza, 677 P.2d 166.
232. 313 S.C. 225, 437 S.E.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1993).
233. Id. at 228, 437 S.E.2d at 130.
234. Graves v. Serbin Farms, Inc., 306 S.C. 60, 409 S.E.2d 769 (1991); Watkins v. Mobile
Oil Corp., 291 S.C. 62, 352 S.E.2d 284 (Ct. App. 1986).
235, Shuler, 313 S.C. at 227, 437 S.E.2d at 129 (citation omitted).
236. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 129 ("'Apparent authority may serve as a basis of liability for a
principal only when the principal manifests... that the agent has certain authority and the third
party reasonably relies on that manifestation.'") (quoting Vereen v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 306
S.C. 423, 412 S.E.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1991)).
237. E.g., Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 354 S.E.2d 632, 636-37 (Ga. Ct. App.), aff'd
sub nom. Richland County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. 1987).
238. Strickland v. Madden, _ S.C. _, _, 448 S.E.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1994).
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elements of reliance and change of position" by the plaintiff. 9 In particular,
the court observed that the plaintiff "makes no claim she changed her position
to her detriment based upon her reliance upon the hospital's alleged representation."' Again, the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied the estoppel
theory with some rigor, in this case in terms consistent with section 267.
The Strickland plaintiffs preserved the direct liability issue by appealing
the trial court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the hospital's
failure to withdraw the allegedly negligent physician's staff privileges."4 The
court observed that negligence "becomes actionable only when it violates some
specific legal duty owed to the plaintiff" 2 and did not further address
whether such a duty might exist in South Carolina. The court recognized the
adoption of such duties in other jurisdictions, however, based on the "public's
perception of and reliance on [the] hospital as [a] multi-faceted health care
facility, as well as [the] hospital's superior position to monitor and control
physician performance."243 The court observed further that, were it to
recognize such duties, their "application would.., require a standard of care
to be established, for example, pursuant to national hospital accreditation
requirements or the hospital's own bylaws." 2 " While Strickland does not
enter into considerations of public policy beyond its passing reference to
"public perception," the opinion strongly suggests that South Carolina courts
will not remain immune to the changing tide of public perception and attendant
public policy, doctrinal difficulties notwithstanding."4

239. Id.
240. Id. at _, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Strickland, - S.C. at__, 448 S.E.2d at 586 (citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166
(Wash. 1984)).
244. Id. (citing Pedroza, 677 P.2d 166).
245. Although beyond the scope of this article, any comprehensive review of applicable South
Carolina public policy should include a review of the extensive body of statutory law governing
hospitals in South Carolina to determine the extent to which these laws contain expressions of
public policy. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1384-85 (Alaska 1987) (employing such
a methodology and stating that Alaska's "regulatory scheme and the purpose underlying it along
with the statutory definition of a hospital, manifests the legislature's recognition that it is the
hospital as an institution which bears ultimate responsibility for complying with the mandates of
the law"); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-110 to -370 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995).
Similarly, any effort to define a new standard of care should consider whether, in light of public
policy, all hospitals should be treated alike, or should be subject to varying legal regimes
depending upon the nature of the hospital (i.e., profit versus nonprofit, private versus public,
private nonprofit community versus private nonprofit religious, etc.).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The eagerness of many courts to find hospital liability for the malpractice
of independent contractor physicians illustrates the larger phenomenon of the
courts' supportive reaction to the changing public perception of hospitals. This
perception has changed in two ways: First, the hospital has lost its perch as
an institution functioning in the public interest and therefore deserving of
support in the form of insulation from liability. Second, the hospital itself has
come to be perceived as the provider of medical services. According to this
view, patients come to the hospital to be cured, and the doctors who practice
there are the hospital's instrumentalities, regardless of the nature of the private
arrangements between the hospital and the physician. Whether or not this
perception is accurate seemingly matters little when weighed against the
momentum of changing public perception and attendant public policy. Both of
these changes in public perception can be ascribed in large part, in the view
of the authors, to the health service industry's re-invention of the hospital as
the center for comprehensive health care delivery. This re-invention of the
image of the hospital has, in turn, generated an increased need for resources,
thus stimulating hospitals to market themselves, using the tools of mainstream
commerce, as comprehensive health care delivery centers.
The essence of the change in public policy is this: Whereas the basis of
hospital liability analysis was once that protecting the hospital benefitted the
public as a whole, the focus is shifting to the expectations of the public and the
individual patient, who is to be protected at the hospital's expense. This new
public policy assigns to the hospital a distributive role bordering on strict
liability. In the common law system, of course, the courts' perception of
public policy is made state by state. It is therefore for the courts of each state
to determine whether the perceptions of public policy in their state require
hospitals to be cast in this new role.
If these various strands of authority are indeed destined to be woven into
the fabric of strict liability of hospitals for medical care of patients, based upon
medical results for which the hospital is found liable on the basis of public
policy, one wonders why the hospital's liability is beginning to exceed so
substantially that of the physicians who perform the medical procedures.
Physicians, after all, are not guarantors or insurers of the results of their own
procedures.246 Physicians are held to an established standard of care, and are
liable only when they have failed to attain that standard and the failure is the
proximate cause of the injury.' Is the hospital's responsibility so great, and

246. Starnes v. Taylor, 158 S.E.2d 339, 343 (N.C. 1968) (cited in Banks v. Medical Univ.
of S.C., _ S.C. _, __, 444 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1994) ("South Carolina has followed the
established tenet that a physician is not an insurer or guarantor of a beneficial result.")).
247. Id. (citing Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1955)).
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the public policy in favor of enforcing this responsibility so irresistible, that
as a principled matter the hospital's exposure to liability should not similarly
be framed? In some states, it appears, the hospitals-and their insurance
companies-have been driven outside the pale.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss3/3

44

